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In this chapter, by reference to modern research on populism, the 
manifestations of this phenomenon in fifth century Athens are analysed, 
while pointing to some legal responses to counter it. Despite the 
rigorous and comprehensive study of Athenian democracy, surprisingly 
enough no systematic application of the concept of populism (as defined 
by modern political theory) to classical Athens has taken place; this 
chapter aims to fill this gap. My conclusion is that modern political 
theory on populism can be legitimately applied to contexts other than 
Western liberal democracies, being particularly suitable for a closer 
analysis of ancient Athens, while in return, Athenian legal and extra-
legal responses to populism could provide valuable guidance on how to 
tame this phenomenon. 
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     The purpose of this chapter is twofold: i) to offer a definition of 
populism in classical Athens, the first and best attested direct democracy, by 
reference to its various manifestations, and ii) a comparison of the findings 
with those of modern political theory on the field. This inductive and 
progressive definition of the concept of Athenian populism and the original 
application of its main features to the evidence from the ancient sources, 
will support the arguable applicability of populism per se to contexts other 
than liberal representative democracies. Populism, if universally defined, 
can be seen as an integral part of authoritarian regimes, as well as of radical, 
direct democracies. 
     Classical Athenian democracy is the main paradigm used by those who 
(truthfully or hypocritically) exalt popular will as the main – and sometimes 
only – legitimate source of political power. Yet the Athenians, recognising 
the pathologies of their late fifth-century BCE (largely populist) regime, 
proceeded to a series of legal and extra-legal amendments to their 
constitution, promoting the rule of law at the expense of the unlimited and 
undiluted will of the people
1
. Despite the rigorous and comprehensive study 
of Athenian democracy, surprisingly enough, no systematic application of 
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the concept of populism (as defined by modern political theory) to classical 
Athens has taken place.  
     The analytical description, within the above context, of this transition 
from a ‘populist’, radical democracy to a demarcated democracy based on 
the rule of law is the second main objective of this chapter. A close 
examination of the means for this transition will take place, focusing on an 
indicative number of legal reforms, as well as on the ‘rhetoric of law’, 
mainly on the popular forensic fora, which strengthened the idea of the rule 
of law and allowed it to dominate the ideological arena of Athenian politics. 
This will be a concluding suggestion as to one possible way of combating 
populism in modern politics. 
     Populism is a widely used, catch-all term in modern political discourse, 
yet would it be appropriate to apply it to settings other than the modern 
Western, representative democracies? For example, would it be appropriate, 
and to what extent, to argue that the Athenian democracy of the fifth and 
fourth centuries BCE was dominated by populist ideology? In the course of 
this chapter it will become evident that some manifestations of Athenian 
populism coincide with and corroborate the findings of modern research on 
the field and that the latter offers the conceptual tools to better analyse and 
comprehend Athenian democracy. 
     Reference to the radical, direct democracy of classical Athens, will assist 
in the further conceptualisation of the ‘notoriously elusive, slippery and hard 
to pin down’
2
 notion of ‘populism’. It will also be useful to explore the 
similarities and differences between its modern manifestations and the 
Athenian practice. The main problem is that the suppleness, chameleonic 
nature and alleged applicability of populism (sometimes at whim) in 
different political and cultural contexts have contributed both to its 
resilience in practical terms but also to a relativism and variation in its 
definition and theoretical conceptualisation. Nevertheless, this fact, from a 
methodological point of view, legitimises the current endeavour to apply 
this concept to a non-liberal, direct (or radical), pre-modern democracy.  
Additionally, it sanctions this study of Athenian populism as referring to a 
regime regularly appealed to by modern populists as the putative model for 
wider democracy, more power to the people and more direct relationship 
between citizen and governance. This endeavour could easily slip to 
anachronistic conclusions. Yet I strongly argue that it is worth the attempt. 
If this experiment proves valid and Athenian populism shares common 
features with its modern counterpart, this would contribute to the better 
definition of this elusive concept on a universal rather than an ad hoc basis.  
Also, the application of current research to Athens will enhance our 
understanding of the unconceptualized ideology of Athenian democracy.  
     Scholars usually approach populism on an inductive and sometimes 
comparative way, examining and analysing its different appearances, in an 
effort to extract generally applicable conclusions. In other words, the 
definition of populism rests on the identification of common practices 
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employed by various and diverse political actors, operating in different 
regions, under disparate ideologies, in dissimilar contexts. Therefore, 
empirically figuring out what might unite under the multifaceted umbrella 
of populism authoritarian, hybrid socialist-populist regimes in Latin 
America, the democratically elected radical left and radical right Syriza-
Anel coalition in Greece, and movements such as the Tea Party, Occupy 
Wall Street in the U.S.A. or the Indignados in Spain, as well as tracing the 
different connotations of the term in diverse historical and geographical 
settings, is seen as the best method to approach and to better understand the 
concept.
3
 If we add to this picture the application of the term to non-
democratic political regimes, such as the Nazi Germany
4
, it becomes 
evident that the assemblage and analysis of such a large volume of data, has 
the epistemological risk of blunting the accuracy and analytical sharpness of 
the relevant terms and concepts
5
. As a result, the term ‘populism’ itself 
could be criticised as lacking a coherent definitional frame, heavily 
depending on the context it is applied.  
 
 
Defining Populism in Modern Political Theory 
 
     Despite the apparent difficulties, some common ground has been found 
and progress has been made on, provisionally at least, agreeing on a set of 
practices, principles and characteristics that could be labelled as populist.
6
 
As a preliminary note, it can be said that despite the fact that populism is 
‘chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent’
7
, the concept per se is 
‘relatively robust’
8
. A definition, with arguable reservations, is provided by 
Cas Mudde who views populism as ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
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. Scholars who perceive populism as an ideology
10
 generally agree 
with its characterisation as ‘thin-centred’, not existing in a ‘pure’ form, 
requiring a thick-centred ideology with a solid normative programme for 
political action (e.g. liberalism, socialism, or even communism and 
nationalism) as a vehicle for its utilisation and flourishing. As it will become 
evident later in this chapter, Athenian populism (in the sense that politics 
should be an expression of the popular will) differed in that respect; I argue 
that it was thick-centred, matching the needs and requirements of Athenian 
radical democracy, thus becoming the dominant, freestanding ideology. 
     On the other hand, populism can be defined as, primarily, a unique style, 
discourse, strategy, political logic or simply as an impulse, an outlook, an 
approach to or a way of doing politics
11
. Those who see populism as a 
strategy have also attempted to offer a minimal definition, with Weyland’s 
being popular among them, particularly applying to Latin American 
populism. Populism is thus defined as ‘a political strategy through which a 
personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, 
unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly 
unorganized followers’
12
. The main focus of this approach is on the persona 
of the leader, the unmediated communication, directness, informality and 
plebiscitarian linkages with the ‘People’ and the expressed general 
frustration with institutionalism and intellectualism. Yet, and although there 
is no reason to believe that populism thrives only in instances of low 
institutionalism or organisation
13
, the specific tactics and rhetoric of this 
broader strategy for the ascendancy to and preservation of power might still 
be similar to those described by scholars who define populism as a style or 
discourse. This view asserts that populism is an appeal that pits the (often 
marginalised and discontented) ‘people’ against a loosely defined 
‘establishment’, ‘elite’ or ‘oligarchy’
14
. Here, the focus lies on the mode of 
political expression evident in text, speech, and performance
15
.  
     Finally, Laclau, focusing on structural considerations and following Carl 
Schmitt on viewing politics as an arena of antagonism and a friend / enemy 
conception, interprets populism as the inner logic of the political
16
.  Laclau 
claimed that any political project is premised on the division between two 
competing antagonistic groups. The way in which these groups are formed 
stems from what he posits as the minimal unit of politico-social analysis: the 
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demand. To put it briefly, when a demand is unsatisfied within any system, 
and then meets other unsatisfied demands, they can form an equivalential 
chain with one another, as they share the common antagonism/enmity of the 
system. A frontier is thus created between this equivalential chain (the 
underdogs) and the establishment. From here, the loose equivalential chain 
between demands is interpellated and finds expression as ‘the people’ 
through a leader. ‘The people’ then demand change to, or of, the system. To 
put it in more concrete terms, Laclau’s formulation of populism 
acknowledges that populists do not speak to or for some pre-existing 
‘people’ but arguably bring the subject known as ‘the people’ into being 
through the process of naming, performance or articulation.
17
. 
     To recap, the primary common features among the different approaches 
to populism are:  
i) The ‘People’ as the nodal point (i.e. as a homogeneous, largely 
fictional, majority);  
ii) antagonism/division in different manifestations (usually against an 
‘Establishment’ or a corrupt Elite). 
      Secondary features include:  
i) anti-pluralism;  
ii) bad manners and anti-intellectualism / anti-institutionalism; 
iii) charismatic leader;  
iv) unmediated communication between the leader and the People. 
      These primary and secondary features will be used in the next part of 
this chapter for a close examination and definition of Athenian populism. 
 
    
Manifestations of Populism in Late 5
th
 C. Athens 
 
     Athens of the late fifth century was a radical democracy, basing its 
decision-making on the decrees of the Assembly, i.e. almost exclusively on 
the will of the people. There was no hierarchy of laws and subsequent 
decrees could annul earlier ones. Appeals to the Demos (the people of 
Athens, all male citizens over the age of eighteen) were common since 
power rested with them. At the start of each Assembly meeting, curses were 
pronounced by the herald on any orator who attempted to mislead the 
people. Whoever wished to speak, delivered his speech directly to the 
people, in an unmediated way. Although the real addressee was only a 
minority, representative segment of the citizen body, speakers nevertheless 
addressed the Assembly as if the whole citizen body was present. The 
people were unaccountable and penalties against illegal or inexpedient 
proposals were solely directed against the orators
18
. Extremely severe 
penalties were provided by law for anyone who misled or did harm to the 
people of Athens
19
. The Demos was emerging as the single most important 
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and overwhelming unit of Athenian politics, as the nodal point of the 
political discourse.  
     The interpellation of the Demos (or, the Athenian People)
20
, namely the 
formation of a group sharing a common, distinct identity (and, as a result, 
having common interests and demands), formally emerged (and through 
time advanced) by the legal measure introduced by Pericles in 451/0 BCE, 
the so-called Pericles’ Citizenship law
21
. This law provided that citizenship 
would be conferred only on gnesioi, namely children whose mother and 
father were both Athenians, while previously the offspring of Athenian men 
who married non-Athenian women was granted citizenship
22
. Modern 
scholars interpret this measure as embracing the common people, against the 
aristocratic practice of inter-marriage with rich non-Athenian oikoi, 
enhancing the status of Athenian mothers and making Athenian citizenship 
a more exclusive category, thus definitively setting Athenians off from all 
others.  
     The formulation of the Demos’ group distinct identity went a step further 
six years later, when in 445/4 BCE Psammetichus, the king of Egypt, sent a 
present to the people of Athens of forty thousand measures of grain, and this 
had to be divided up among the citizens. This triggered a diapsephismos (a 
check on the registers of citizens) and a series of prosecutions, resulting, 
according to Plutarch, to a little less than five thousand convictions by the 
popular courts
23
. The Athenians as a distinct group were beginning to 
consciously act for the defence of their common interests, deriving from 
their exclusive rights of now formally and well-defined citizenship.  
     The interpellation of this group emerged and developed not in a bottom-
up way like the one Laclau envisages (i.e. as a front equivalential chain of 
unsatisfied ‘demands’ of the marginalised people) but primarily from top-
down initiatives by people like Pericles (the ‘leader’) who strengthened a 
specific group’s identity (not necessarily or exclusively the ‘underdogs’, 
who supported and voted for the Citizenship law in the Assembly), and 
could rely on this group to advance and preserve their political dominance. 
Supposedly, it is not a coincidence that a few years after the introduction of 
measures such as the jurors’ pay and the citizenship law, especially after the 
‘clearing up’ of the registers from nothoi (non-gnesioi) and the coming of 
age of those benefited by the law of 451/0, Pericles succeeded in 
formulating an electorate which would keep him in the forefront of 
Athenian politics until his death in 429 BCE. 
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       The division between the gnesioi citizens and the non-citizens 
sharpened and was now demarcated by law. The first group shared common 
advantages, such as jury pay
24
, and – at the issue of who should qualify as 
citizen – a common demand, deriving from their exclusive citizen status. It 
seems that while Cimon, Pericles’ main political opponent in the 460s, 
focused on the people of his deme as the main target group of supporters
25
, 
Pericles (successfully, as proven by his subsequent career) expanded his 
perspective and promoted policies to first interpellate and then to appeal to 
the Demos as a whole, as a distinct and increasingly venerated group
26
. 
Pericles cultivated a magisterial image of a charismatic leader, being the 
opposite of a modern populist persona, making rare public appearances and 
usually relying on his network of friends and supporters to introduce and 
propose measures he endorsed
27
. Yet, the aforementioned strategy, which 
assisted in the interpellation of the People as a group, can be described as 
populist.  
     Old fashioned, mainly aristocratic, politicians operated through (more or 
less) institutionalised networks (family ties, friends, gene, hetaireiai). 
Plutarch in the Life of Pericles (11-14), despite somewhat anachronistically 
referring to the presence of political parties
28
, describes Thucydides’ (son of 
Melesias) tactics, as the leader of the conservative group and main opponent 
of Pericles in the 440s. Plutarch says that Thucydides:   
 
‘would not suffer the party of the "Good and Noble," as they called 
themselves, to be scattered up and down and blended with the 
populace, as heretofore, the weight of their character being thus 
obscured by numbers, but by culling them out and assembling them 
into one body, he made their collective influence, thus become 
weighty, as it were a counterpoise in the balance’. 
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     This visualisation of the distinct group in the Assembly, possibly had the 
unpredicted result of the further interpellation of the common people 
through the deepening of the division and the antagonism between the 
“Good and Noble” and the masses (which, of course, is the second main 
feature of populism)
29
. Thucydides, in 444/3 BCE, was eventually 
ostracised and Pericles dominated Athenian politics until his death in 429 
BCE
30
. Roughly at this period, the Pseudo-Xenophon (also known as the 
‘Old Oligarch’), proving the now conscious division of the Athenian 
society, wrote in his ‘Constitution of the Athenians’: 
 
‘the poor and the Demos generally are right to have more than the 
highborn and wealthy, for the reason that it is the people who man the 
ships and impart strength to the city.’ 
 
      This observation describes the now opposing interests and demands of 
the distinct, more or less antagonistic, groups in Athens. This conflict would 
eventually escalate with the war, as usually happens during crises. The 
emergence of the Demos as the nodal point of Athenian politics continued 
after the death of Pericles, with new politicians (the so-called demagogues), 
of a different style and manners, taking advantage of this new structural 
development in Athenian politics, hence becoming prominent particularly 
during the Peloponnesian War
31
. Cleon, the most typical example of them, 
established uninstitutionalised and unmediated communication with the 
People as a whole. He was both a real strategist and tactician as far as 
populism is concerned. To embrace the People as a whole, in a symbolic 
gesture, Cleon repudiated his friends, thus liberating himself from their 
influence
32
. He was not a member of an hetaireia (an upper-class political 
club), as was the case for other politicians too of this new style
33
, thus 
enabling themselves to legitimately represent the underdogs and rely on the 
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following and support of the unorganised masses. Hetaireiai, solely 
confined to upper classes, contributed to the marginalisation of poor citizens 




     Many of the features of modern populists are concentrated in the persona 
of Cleon: a charismatic leader who appeals to the People in an unmediated 
way, a proponent of anti-institutionalism and anti-intellectualism, exhibiting 
a populist style characterised by divisive rhetoric and bad manners. Cleon is 
described by Thucydides (3.36.6; cf. 4.21.3) as “the most violent man at 
Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with the demos”. He had 
carried a motion of putting all Mytilenians to death after their revolt against 
Athenian rule in 427 BCE, but the demos changed their mind and a further 
debate was called. During this second debate, Cleon demonstrates his 
leadership skills, though refrains from pandering the people. Nevertheless, 
his divisive rhetoric, through an affiliation with the ordinary people, who are 
presented as the real upholders of the laws, and a sheer anti-intellectualism, 
is evident: 
 
‘[o]rdinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more 
gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the 
laws, and to overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that 
they cannot show their wit in more important matters, and by such 
behaviour too often ruin their country; while those who mistrust their 
own cleverness are content to be less learned than the laws, and less 
able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair 
judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct affairs 
successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by 
cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our 
real opinions.’ (Thucydides. 3.37.3-5) 
 
     To this argument, Diodotus, Cleon’s main adversary in the Mytilenean 
debate, replied along the following lines. Firstly, open debate and pluralism 
are integral features of good decision-making and anyone opposing this is 
senseless or interested. If such a person, “wishing to carry a disgraceful 
measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks best 
to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny” (Thucydides 
3.42.2). Secondly, Cleon’s bad manners, accusations and, ultimately, anti-
pluralism, might “deprive the city of its advisers” (Thucydides. 3.42.4).  
Antagonistic rhetoric and divisive accusations of conspiracy and corruption 
directed against his opponents, seem to be Cleon’s favourite discourse. 
Aristophanes in the Knights has Cleon crying out ‘Conspirators, 
conspirators!’ whenever he sees the chorus of upper-class members. Posing 
himself as an anti-establishment figure and using aggressive rhetorical 
tactics (‘he was the first person to use bawling and abuse on the platform, 
and to gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons 
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speaking in orderly fashion’ according to Aristotle,  Ath. Pol. 28.3) Cleon 
was thought to have done the most to corrupt the people by such impetuous 
outbursts (cf. Aristophanes, Knights l. 137). 
     Cleon’s unmediated affiliation with the Demos, allegedly acting as their 
champion, is evident in the following passage relating to the negotiations 
about truce with Spartan envoys (Thucydides 4.22.1-2): 
 
‘[the] envoys made no reply but asked that commissioners might be 
chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly talk 
the matter over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon 
violently assailed them, saying that he knew from the first that they 
had no right intentions, and that it was clear enough now by their 
refusing to speak before the people, and wanting to confer in secret 
with a committee of two or three. No! if they meant anything honest let 
them say it out before all.’ 
 
    As happens in most crises, the Peloponnesian war raised passions and led 
to divisions among the people. Extreme voices and manners, such as 
Cleophon’s, who according to Aristotle, Ath. Pol. (34.1) prevented the 
conclusion of peace by completely deceiving the demos, ‘coming into the 
assembly, drunk and wearing a corset, and protesting that he would not 
allow it unless the Lacedaemonians surrendered all the cities’, escalated the 
tensions between the different groups. The moderate Nicias, during the 
heated debate on the Athenian expedition to Syracuse in 415 BCE, endorsed 
and fuelled this multilevel division while attacking the ambitious Alcibiades 
and his followers: 
 
‘And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to 
command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of 
his own […] do not allow such an one to maintain his private 
splendour at his country's risk […] this is a matter of importance, and 
not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand. When I see 
such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and 
summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of 
the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let 
himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do 
not vote for war.’ (Thucydides 6.12.2-13.1) 
 
     The gradual consolidation of new, divergent demands due to the ongoing 
war, interpellated antagonistic groups (mainly a pro-war and an anti-war 
one) with the result that emotions and tensions were heightened and the 
ground for populist tactics was paved. The nature of Athenian politics which 
provided for power to ultimately lie with the demos could provoke 
irresponsible leadership and populist manipulation. This was acknowledged 




‘Nothing is more foolish and violent than a useless mob; for men 
fleeing the insolence of a tyrant to fall victim to the insolence of the 
unguided populace is by no means to be tolerated. Whatever the one 
does, he does with knowledge, but for the other knowledge is 
impossible; how can they have knowledge who have not learned or 
seen for themselves what is best, but always rush headlong and drive 
blindly onward, like a river in flood?’ 
 
     In Euripides’ Suppliants (423 BCE), in the debate between Theseus and 
the Theban herald, the latter, critical of the ignorant masses who can be 
easily swayed, observes that:  
 
‘the city from which I come is ruled by one man only, not by the mob; 
no one there puffs up the citizens with specious words, and for his own 
advantage twists them this way or that [...]. Besides, how would the 
people, if it cannot form true judgments, be able rightly to direct the 
state?’ 
 
     This is part and parcel of the observation in Euripides’ Orestes (408 
BCE) that ‘whenever a man with a pleasing trick of speech, but of unsound 
principles, persuades the mob, it is a serious evil to the state’” (line 910). 
The exemplary case of Athenian populism and, I would suggest, its 
culmination as ideology per se, comes from the aftermath of the Battle of 
Arginusae (406 BCE) and the euphemistically called ‘Trial of the 
Generals’
35
. In that event, the Athenian Assembly, following a series of 
neglects of the normal institutional legal procedures, decided with a single 
vote to execute all the winning generals without trial (unconstitutionally, 
according to Athenian perceptions, notwithstanding the anachronism of the 
term), for failing to collect the bodies of the dead (and, possibly, of the 
survivors of the shipwrecks) from the sea due to a storm (Xenophon, Hell. 
1.6.35; Diodorus Siculus 13.100.1-6). The generals’ speeches, in the first 
debate which was convened in order for them to give account to the 
Athenian people in the Assembly, were shorter than what the law provided 
(Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.5)
36
. The Council (Boule) was then instructed to bring 
a proposal as to what sort of trial the generals should have.  
     Xenophon and the subsequent developments leave no doubt as to the 
illegality of the Council’s proposal and the motives of its initiators. 
Callixenus, being bribed by the people who wanted the generals executed, 
introduced a motion whereby the fate of all generals would be tried by a 
single vote, collectively, and since they had already spoken before the 
Assembly at the earlier debate, the requirement of having a speech in their 
                                                          
35
 Andrewes (1974). 
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 One can speculate that the cause for this was the uproar (thorubos) caused by - and 
against - their speeches by the masses. The mere endorsement of thorubos as a legitimate 
way for the people of expressing their opinion and silencing the speaker is a counter-




defence has putatively been fulfilled. Voices in the Assembly against the 
legality of this measure were silenced by the threat of applying the same 
measure (execution without trial) to any disagreeing parties. The response 
was a monument to undiluted populism: 
 
‘And some of the people applauded this act, but the greater number 
cried out that it was monstrous if the people were to be prevented 
from doing whatever they wished’ (τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ 
μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται.). (Xenophon, 
Hell.1.7.12) 
 
     Some of the orators endorsed this view, pandering the people, escalating 
and capitalising the people’s fury: 
 
 ‘Indeed, when Lyciscus thereupon moved that these men should be 
judged by the very same vote as the generals, unless they withdrew the 
summons, the mob broke out again with shouts of approval 
(ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος), and they were compelled to withdraw 
the summonses’. (Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.12-14) 
     Socrates happened to be the official responsible for putting the measure 
to the vote on that day
37
. He refused to do so declaring that he would do 
nothing that was contrary to the law. The atmosphere of this debate is 
clearly described in the Apology (32b-c): 
 
‘I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a 
bouleutes; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you 
wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had 
failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as 
you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the 
prytaneis who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and 
although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and 
though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the 
risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with 
you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or 
death.’ 
 
     The aforementioned incidents from the ‘Trial of the Generals’ did not 
emerge accidentally. Instead, there was a well-thought, coordinated plan to 
arouse the people’s emotions, mobilise them, and unite them under a 
common demand: the punishment of those responsible. A critical mass of 
followers was gathered by Theramenes, the leader of those who demanded 
the execution of the generals. They were instructed to dress in black and 
shave their heads as if they were the grieving kinsmen of those lost after the 
battle. People’s fury was escalating, and the only thing now required was its 
capitalisation. Even a man got up in the Assembly, claiming that he was a 
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survivor of the shipwrecks and was instructed by those who were drowning, 
if he got away safely, to report to the people of Athens that the generals did 
nothing to rescue the men who had fought bravely for the country 
(Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.11). The cynical exploitation of dramatic events 
aiming at the utilisation of people’s emotions is often linked to populism, 
since it is the channelling of the will of the people which eventually decides 





Legal and Extra-Legal Responses to Athenian Populism 
 
     If the ideology of populism - namely the belief that the People could 
unrestrictedly and unaccountably, with complete impunity, pass any 
measures whatsoever, despite their inexpediency or, even worse, illegality - 
was close to degenerate the Athenian democracy, the two oligarchic coups 
(411/0 BCE and 404/3 BCE) and the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian 
war, revealed the necessity of countering this phenomenon. The Athenian 
responses were multifarious, ranging from the political and legal arenas to 
the ideological battlefield. Some of the measures were introduced 
throughout the course of Athenian democracy and only further evolved, 
matured, or directed against the phenomenon of undiluted populism. Others 
were probably designed and implemented on purpose after the restoration of 
democracy in 403 BCE. While references will be made to the collective 
outcome of such measures, the main focus of this chapter will be on the 
rhetorical efforts, especially in the popular courts, which would allow 
success in this ideological brade de fer. 
     One of the features which makes an audience more susceptible to 
populism is their marginalisation, the belief that they belong to an 
‘underdog culture’ which differentiates them from and pits them against the 
establishment or the elite
39
. This is the main reason of the populists’ divisive 
and antagonistic rhetoric, in an effort to create a common, visible enemy for 
the ‘underdogs’, display to them their common demands and, thus, 
interpellate them as a group with a shared identity and set of beliefs. This is 
also the main reason as to why populism, being a protest movement, rarely 
becomes the ‘Establishment’; however, when this happens, populists tend to 
behave similarly to the ‘professional politicians’ they once reprimanded. 
The seed of Athenian populism, growing in the fertile ground of Athenian 
democracy, gradually emancipated and mobilised (mainly politically) quasi-
marginalised groups, brought them to the forefront and became the 
dominant ideology.  
                                                          
38
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     Despite the numerous and sophisticated procedures for holding officials 
into account (e.g. dokimasiai; euthunai; graphe paranomon; graphe nomon 
me epitedion theinai), the Demos, the ultimate decision-maker in the 
Assembly and judge in the popular Courts, remained unaccountable
40
. The 
oaths, prayers and curses in the Assembly before its convocation and the 
Heliastic oath taken by all 6,000 judges (Athenian male citizens over the age 
of 30) in any given year, were proactive measures with uncertain 
reliability
41
. Yet, these measures contributed to the interpellation of the 
Athenian people under a noble objective: their adherence to the rule of law 
and their pride in its protection. A counter ideology was emerging to unite 
the, so far, (at times) reactionary people, under a common demand and 
objective: to make the Athenian system different from those of other city-
states and link the democracy to the rule of law rather than the rule of the 
masses. This effort, though premature, was evident during the Trial of the 
Generals when Euryptolemus, arguing for a trial in accordance with the law, 
said: 
 
‘Let no such act be yours, men of Athens, but guard the laws, which 
are your own and above all else have made you supremely great, and 
do not try to do anything without their sanction.’ (Xenophon, Hell. 
1.2.29) 
 
     In an effort to place appropriate constitutional limits, the Athenians 
ordered a revision of the law-code (in the aftermath of the oligarchic coup in 
411 BCE)
42
 which paved the way for the subsequent hierarchy of norms and 
distinction between laws (of general application and permanent nature) and 
decrees (temporary, of individual application). The law-making process in 
the fourth century was now initiated by the Assembly but was entrusted to 
the board of Nomothetai (law-givers)
43
. Numerous law-court speeches 
survive from cases triggered by the legal procedures protecting the 
constitution and scrutinising the constitutionality and expediency of 
proposed laws and decrees. At a later date, showcasing how the Athenian 
democracy continued evolving into a regime based on the rule of law, there 
was the establishment of the board of Nomofulakes (guardians of the Laws) 
(c. 330s BCE) to overview the office-holders’ conformity with the laws. 
      The emergence of the rule of law as ideology, culminating during the 
fourth century (contrary to what Athenians of the late fifth century had 
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 On the laws and procedures in Athenian law, see Harrison (1968-1971); MacDowell 
(1986). 
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 The Heliastic oath, among other things, provided that: ‘I will cast my vote in consonance 
with the laws and with the decrees passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there 
is no law, in consonance with my sense of what is most just, without favour or enmity. I 
will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to accusers 
and defenders alike.’ On the Heliastic oath see Harris (2013) Ch. 3: ‘The Judicial Oath’; 
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42
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experienced) is also evident in the writings of the period. Aristotle 
straightforwardly provides that ‘[t]he rule of law is preferable to that of a 
single citizen.’ (Aristotle, Politics. 1287a 16–20) while Hyperides in his 
funeral speech, linking democracy with the rule of law and contrasting it 
with authoritarianism, claims that ‘For men to be happy they must be ruled 
by the voice of law, not the threats of a man’ (Hyperides, Epit. 25). 
Aeschines also links democracy (against oligarchy) with the rule of law:  
 
‘You are well aware, men of Athens, that there are three kinds of 
constitution in the whole world, dictatorship (tyrannis), oligarchy, and 
democracy, and dictatorships and oligarchies are governed by the 
temperament of those in power, whereas democratic cities are 
governed by the established laws.’ (Aeschines 3.6) 
 
     The lawbreaker is now perceived as an enemy of the law and, as a result, 
an enemy of the state democracy (and the People). Demosthenes, as the 
accuser of a person who putatively committed the offence of hubris, calls 
the numerous jurors in session to rescue themselves and the laws: 
 
‘If I prove that the insults of Meidias touch, not me only, but you and 
the laws and the whole body of citizens, to come at once to my rescue 
and to your own.’ (βοηθῆσαι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.) (Demosthenes 
21.7) 
 
     People are now united under a noble objective. Their real strength, and 
the strength of the democratic constitution, derive not from the unlimited 
power of decision-making afforded to the Demos but to the power of the 
people to uphold and protect the rule of law:  
 
‘Oligarchs and all who run a constitution based on inequality must be 
on guard against people who attempt to overthrow the constitution by 
force; but you, and all who have a constitution based on equality and 
law, must watch out for people whose words and way of life 
contravene the laws. For your real strength is when you are ruled by 
law and are not subverted by men who break them.’ (Aeschines 1.4-5) 
 
     Everyone is equal before the law and this is the basic premise of this new 
ideology. Ordinary people and office-holders are equally ruled by law: 
 
‘For where we have laws expressly drafted for the case, surely 
punishment should fall alike on those who disobey them and on those 
who order an infringement of them.’ (Lysias 22.10) 
 
     Yet, there is a crucial point which needs to be stressed. The ‘People’ 
apply the law, they are the guardians of the law, they are not identified with 




‘laws were laid down by you before the particular offences were 
committed, when the future wrongdoer and his victim were equally 
unknown. What is the effect of these laws? They ensure for every 
citizen the opportunity of obtaining redress if he is wronged. 
Therefore, when you punish a man who breaks the laws, you are not 
delivering him over to his accusers; you are strengthening the arm of 




     The hegemonic position of the ‘rule of law’ ideology in the law-court 
speeches is primarily evident in the rhetoric of litigants. Regardless of the 
revision stages before their publication, forensic speeches had to be 
appealing to the minds and values of the Athenian laymen jurors
45
. Hence, 
we may safely assume that references to the dominance of the ‘rule of law’ 
ideology were positively accepted by the audience. The ‘participant 
personality’ of the ancient Athenians
46
 - meaning that their ideas and values 
were largely shared with the community they found themselves in and they 
had strong incentives to show adherence to these norms - combined with the 
endorsement and respect they show for the rule of law in their speeches, 
prove that this principle was now advancing to become the guiding one in 
regulating their behaviour. The character evidence which litigants 
generously provide in their speeches corroborates the above point. The 
alignment of ethical norms with state laws allowed litigants to point to their 







     This chapter has offered a description of populism as an ideology. This is 
the first time that populism is seen as a freestanding, rather than a ‘thin’ 
ideology. Populist ideology in Athens of the late fifth century, inductively 
approached, offered the main set of ideas which ultimately supported the 
democratic regime. Its various manifestations (as a style, discourse, strategy 
and political logic) corroborate and advance the findings of modern political 
theory. Whether or not originally being a movement of the ‘underdogs’, the 
(mainly) top-down interpellation of the demos as a unique group with a 
distinct identity, made it the ruling class of the city. Crisis, in the form of the 
Peloponnesian war, contributed to the emergence of a new type of leaders, 
developing innovative tactics and techniques to approach and sometimes 
manipulate the people.   
                                                          
44
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     The populist ideology of the new ruling class, namely the mass of 
Athenian citizens, which provided for the largely unaccountable and 
unlimited power of the demos, proved to be dangerous for the running of the 
Athenian city state. The response was an emerging ideology of the rule of 
law, providing for safeguarding structures and rules to secure a smooth 
implementation of democracy, preventing its degeneration into mob rule. 
The introduction of new legal procedures and provisions was part of this 
ideological reform and actually paved the way for the gradual dominance of 
the ‘rule of law’ ideology. This could be a lesson to be learnt by the history 
of Athenian laws regarding modern day populism; building a legal and 
extra-legal bulwark against it in the form of a strong counter ideology, 
capable of uniting the people under a noble objective, could be a solution.  
Nevertheless, the least that this chapter has achieved, through the 
application of populism to the Athenian setting, is a further proof of the 
resilient and chameleonic nature of the concept of populism. More research 
needs to be done on the field, yet classical Athens is definitely worth 
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